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Euro exchange rates: what can be expected 





This paper discusses some of the issues related to the determi­
nation of the future behavior of euro exchange rates. It considers 
the impact of European-wide productivity and velocity distur­
bances on ‘portfolio’ diversification in Europe, under a single cur­
rency. The new currency may be less volatile than the pre-existing 
European currencies given that the aggregate GDP growth may 
be more stable and more correlated with GDP growth in the US 
and Japan. However, although productivity trends are not likely 
to change dramatically, the behavior of velocity can change sub­
stantially, during or after the change in regime. The extent to 
which this will be relevant will depend on the policy choices of 
the ECB, since there Eire some policy rules, such as nominal in­
come targeting, more appropriate than others for insulating the 
economy from velocity disturbances.
*1 am grateful to my supervisor Michael Artis and to Matthew Canzoneri for useful 






















































































































































































A number of different studies have analyzed the issue of the volatility of 
the euro, the newly born European single currency. In the short term 
it is likely that portfolio adjustments will bring some instability to the 
system. However, another important question is whether, in the longer 
term, euro exchange rates will prove more or less volatile than the ex­
change rates of the pre-existing European currencies. To answer this 
question Martin (1997) builds an argument on the basis that the EMU 
area will be larger and less open than any individual member state, and 
concludes that the bigger the Union, the more stable the euro will be. By 
investigating the relationship between ‘size’ and volatility. Martin finds a 
hump-shaped relationship between exchange rate volatility and country 
size. The reason is that very large countries, which are relatively less 
open, have fewer incentives to use exchange rate policy strategically to 
stabilize the economy.
Contradicting this argument, however, both Bcnassy-Qucre, Mo- 
jon and Pisani-Ferry(1997) and Cohen(1997) raise, in their theoretical 
models, the possibility that a policy of benign neglect may be the cause 
of a rise in exchange rate instability in Europe, after EMU. Masson and 
Turtelboom (1997). on the other hand, point to the fact that a benign 
neglect attitude on the part of the European monetary authority may not 
be possible. They argue that the uncertainties that will be faced by the 
European Central Bank (EC’B) are likely to force the latter to adopt dis­
cretionary policies, relying on various economic indicators, one of which 
may be the market value of the euro, an indicator that is highly visible 
to the public. In addition to this argument, it can also be added that 
pressures from member states for exchange rate stability measures may 
also arise, if their competitiveness starts eroding. On several occasions 
throughout history, large and persistent changes in exchange rates have 
been accompanied by strong political pressures for protectionism in coun­




























































































(1996)).1 With policy coordination between the ECB and the FED. Mas­
son and Turtelboom (1997) estimate that a policy towards exchange rate 
stability will not lead to significant changes in inflation variability- How­
ever. without such coordination, increased volatility against the dollar 
may put pressure on the ECB to intervene alone in the foreign exchange 
market, possibly hampering its credibility for fighting inflation. This pos­
sibility makes it important to understand under what circumstances t he 
euro can bring more volatility into the international monetary system.
All the euro volatility studies mentioned above focus mainly on how 
the responsiveness of the exchange rate to shocks may change after its 
introduction, paying little attention on the occurrence of the shocks them­
selves. Including more idiosyncratic economies in the monetary union will 
be similar to diversifying a portfolio and will thus diminish the specific 
risk associated with the economy that issues the new currency. Volatility 
may diminish, because Euroland's business cycle will be less volatile and 
more correlated with the cycles in the other major economies. Tims a 
decline in exchange rate volatility may not be attributed to the ECB’s 
actions per se. In fact, the ECB should take this aspect into consid­
eration when defining its policies, since some monetary policy choices 
may be more appropriate than others for insulating the economy from 
destabilizing EU-wide disturbances.
This paper considers the impact of European-wide productivity and 
velocity disturbances on ‘portfolio diversification' in Europe, under a sin­
gle currency. Two other recent studies that pay more attention to the be­
havior of Eurozone disturbances are Ricci and Isard (1998) and Benassy- 
Quere and Mojon (1998). The first study investigates the effects of mone­
tary union on exchange rate variability using a three-country, three-good,
1 McKinnon argues that “exchange rate variability has a property that promotes a 
general rise of trade barriers" and is responsible for the increased use of quotas and 
other market-sharing schemes since the mid 1970’s. Recent contributions showing that 
currency instability can have negative effects on competitiveness include Dixit(1989) 
and Krugman(1989a,1989b). In these papers, uncertainty is costly because it leads to 
delays in "real changes in the world economy that should be met by investment and 




























































































factor-specific model of trade with wage rigidity. It shows that the rel­
ative variability of the euro exchange rates may depend on the relative 
sizes and specialization patterns of EMU countries and the relative im­
portance of different shocks. The study developed in the present paper, 
however, tries to take into account all the different shocks simultaneously 
and to consider the possibility of a decreased pattern of specialization in 
Europe, or. at least of more business cycle correlation.
The second study, by Benassy-Quere and Mojon (1998). is an em­
pirical analysis where stochastic simulations are performed on a simple 
three country macroeconomic model of the United States. Germany and 
France, in order to compare the variability of various macroeconomic vari­
ables. including the transatlantic exchange rates. Their simulations show 
that EMU could reduce the variability of the transatlantic exchange rate, 
but in their study the asymmetries in Europe are minimized by reducing 
the euro zone to Germany and France. As the authors explain, extending 
this analysis to other European countries would provide a more exhaus­
tive stochastic representation of European-wide sources of shocks, but 
would have the drawback of impeding the interpretation of results. The 
analysis developed in this paper, built on a simpler model, exactly tries 
to investigate how volatility may depend on the membership of the cur­
rency area, simultaneously making the point that the creation of EMU 
does not enhance the ‘size’ of any existing economy but instead com­
bines different economies with different characteristics to back a single 
currency. Benassy-Quere and Mojon f 1998) s results are also very much 
dependent on the monetary policy reaction functions chosen for Europe 
and the US. while the present study tries to control for two different 
policy rules.
The model used in this paper is based on that of Canzoneri and 
Dellas (1995). The latter is a Cash-in-Advance model, where consumers 
are share-holders and divide their income between consumption, money, 
bonds, and equity shares. Goods are perfect substitutes and therefore, a 
PPP relation and a quantity theory of money relation emerge, identifying 




























































































both central banks involved target nominal income, the volatility of the 
exchange rate between two currencies will depend on the behavior of the 
productivity shocks in the issuing countries. The authors explore the 
theoretical implications of the model for a Union comprising Germany. 
France, Italy and the UK. This paper’s version of the model tries to 
address the fact that the traditional empirical tests of long-run PPP 
have failed to find cointegration between the nominal exchange rate and 
relative prices. There is some evidence that the omission of transactions 
costs may be the cause of the rejection of a cointegrating relation in 
these tests. Aizenman(1984) outlines some of the effects of transactions 
costs on purchasing power parity and later studies such as Davutyan 
and Pippenger(1990) and Michael, Nobay and Peel(1997) have tried to 
develop the econometric implications of those effects. Due to difficulties 
in the measurement of transactions costs, a ‘bias’ is caused by their 
omission in estimation of the variability of the exchange rate.
Additionally, the present study extends the empirical analysis in 
Canzoneri et al.(1995), by combining most EU members (all apart from 
Belgium, the Luxembourg. Spain and Greece)2 in several possible ‘EMUs’ 
and by introducing a longer sample period. Using quarterly GDP data 
between 1974-1995. it concludes that for most countries or groups of 
countries membership enhances the stability of the euro against both the 
dollar and the yen. except for the membership of Sweden and Denmark 
which is found to have a positive impact on the volatility of the euro-yen 
exchange rate. Overall, the results obtained show that the new currency 
may well be less volatile than the deutschemark, which is the natural 
benchmark to use as the deutschemark was the European currency with 
the most predominant role in International Finance. This reflects the 
fact that aggregate Eurozone GDP growth may be more stable and more 
correlated with GDP growth in the US and Japan. Finally, this paper 
addresses the endogeneity problems relevant to these results. Although 
productivity trends are not likely to change quickly after the formation of 
EMU, other characteristics of the economy such as the velocity of money,





























































































that may be involved in the determination of exchange rate volatilities, 
may be altered substantially and more quickly. As stated in the conclu­
sions. the weight of this factor will depend on the policy choices of the
The remainder of this paper is organized in another six sections. 
Section two presents the model, while section three discusses the effects 
of output disturbances on exchange rate volatility, under nominal in­
come targets. Section four describes the methodology for aggregating 
output trends in EMU and testing the effects of a country's or a group 
of countries’ membership in the monetary union and the subsequent sec­
tion presents and discusses the empirical results. In section six results 
are derived for the case where central banks target money growth in­
stead of nominal income and their robustness is analyzed. Section seven 
concludes.
Consider a world economy comprised of three countries: the US. Ger­
many and France. This will be sufficient to derive results which can 
easily be generalized. In this economy, each period, an infinitely lived 
representative consumer maximizes expected utility Ut:
where E, is the expectations operator (consumers maximize expected 
utility because they are uncertain about the stream of future earnings), 
3  is a positive discount factor and cT = a,c,T +  cvjcy +  a*c*.T is the 
"utility weighted” consumption basket of the representative consumer, 
which includes the consumption of goods invoiced in currency i (clT) . in 
currency j  (cJT) and currency k (c*T))- The function ;/(.) is continuously 
differentiable and strictly increasing in all arguments and the ‘baskets’ of
EG’B.
2 The M odel
( i )




























































































goods are substitutes for one another, with marginal rates of substitution 
given by the ratios a, /ay , for all i. j  , i /  j .  Finally, notice that 
subscripts denote the currencies of invoice, i =  d. g. f :  j  =  d .g . f  : k = 
d ,g , f .  and time respectively:
d =  dollar 
g — deutschemark 
/  =  french-franc
At the beginning of period r consumers receive income and trade assets. 
After this financial exchange, they are able to buy each good j  using cash, 
and the percentage gjT of period’s r  nominal income invoiced in currency 
j . 3 The remaining portion of that income can only be used for consump­
tion if it is converted into money in the next financial exchange. This 
means that, at each time r, consumers face Cash-in-Advance constraints 
of the form:
M j T  +  Vj t P j t ^ j t  >  P jrC jT ( 2)
Here pJT is the price level of goods invoiced in currency j: \] T is frac­
tion of real income invoiced in currency j ,  over which the individual has 
claims: and MJT is the amount of currency j  nominal cash balances held 
at period r. During the financial exchange, together with cash balances, 
consumers can also acquire one period bonds invoiced in each currency 
- Bjr.'ij - which will pay positive nominal interest ijT. Cash balances 
and bonds invoiced in one currency are characterized by how cheap it 
is to make transactions in that currency’s foreign exchange market. If 
it is relatively expensive there is a ‘tax’ for making purchases of assets 
denominated in that currency. If it is relatively cheap there is a ‘liq­
uidity premium’. Let ipJT denote the transactions costs in the market
1 "f- 'll) '
for currency i. Then. ------- — will give the ‘tax’/  ‘liquidity-premium’ for
1 T  t/’ir





























































































buying assets denominated in currency j .  using wealth denominated in 
currency i. This provides a very simple way of introducing transactions 
costs linked with the liquidity characteristics of the different markets. 
A more detailed treatment of those can be found in Rev (1997). Given 
the assumptions stated above, the purchase of assets is subject to the 
following budget constraint, expressed in units of currency ?:
[h ;t -  E,r\ * ,T + ej? [UjT -  EjT] * jT +  +eiTk [ir ,T -  E kr] > 0 (3)
where
'k,T =  1 + l i \ T ^ J T  =  1 +  V j T *1’ k T  =  1 +  V 'kT
and where e'J and e'Tk are the exchange rates used to convert units of 
currency j  and units of currency k. respectively, into units of currency i. 
W jT stands for the wealth carried through to period r'.s financial exchange 
and EjT . for period r'.s expenditure in financial assets, for all j .  such 
that:
i r , T  = ( M r r - l ) +  pJT-lV ,T- 1 - f "  (1 h r —l)-R?r—1 T  7)- Pir— lCjr—1
W i r  = W i r - l ) 1 +  J T - 1 +  (1 +  +  T jT —  PjT — 1 Cj  T — J
flier = (M k r -1 ) +  PkT— lkjcr-- 1  +  ( 1  +  i k T - l ) B k T- \  +  Tkr ~  P kT -\C kr- \
E , r =  M , t  +  B, T
E j r —  M jt +  B jr
E kr =  ^ h r  +  B kr
For all j .  Tjt are lump sum nominal transfers granted (claimed) by the 
government. Since the cash-in-advance constraints (2) and the financial 
budget constraint (3) will be binding4 5, the period t first order conditions 
(F.O.C.s) for the maximization of the consumer’s utility subject to these 
two constraints take the following form:0
4Int.erest rates are positive and utility is increasing in all arguments and depends 
only on consumption.
5Appendix 9 shows the extensive version of the budget constraint, from which it 































































































,, , m a i  + *!>«) ^  n
u'(ct) --------------------------- < 0
a,
1 +  t j t)
u'(ct) -  f ' ' l- J- ■ < 0
n j
- 1 — - / 3 E = 0
(1  +  l i t )  h t  1 +  Wit
(i +  ijt) L ^  e< 1 +  Vji
where fit is the shadow price associated with the budget constraint and 
u'(c() denotes the derivative of m(c() with respect to ct.
In what regards monetary and fiscal policies, it will be assumed that 
each fiscal authority sets the level of the primary deficit. TJt. while the 
independent central banks decide how much will be monetized. Govern­
ment bond issues are then endogenously determined by the governments’ 
budget constraints:
M jt + B)t =  M]t_x +  5 ^ ( 1  +  rit-x) +  T]t Vj
where M*t is the money supply in currency j .  whereas B sJt is the supply 
of bonds invoiced in currency j .  for all j .  In addition, in this world 
economy, market clearing conditions are given by:































































































A competitive equilibrium, when all currencies are valued, in this 
economy, is defined as a sequence of prices {P jt-ijt-ct j , _ 0 ■ an^ a^ oca- 
tions {c.jt, Mjt. B jt }^l0, for all i . j ,  such that: (i) cash-in advance con­
straints described by equation (2) are satisfied with equality (this follows 
from the assumptions on the utility function and nominal interest rates):
(ii) all F.O.C.s are satisfied with equality; (Hi) the consumers' budget 
constraints (3) are satisfied until equality; (iv) the govemients' budget 
constraints are satisfied; (v ) market clearing conditions are satisfied: and. 
finally, (in) the transversality condition and the no-Ponzi-game condition 
are both satisfied.
Notice that the fact that all F.O.C.s hold with equality (because 
all currencies are assumed to be valued) implies an 'augmented PPP’ 
relationship in this equilibrium:
(1 + ip,t)p„ _ etJpj t (l +  t'j,) _  j j  _ plt (<*] 1 + F'„\
a, Qj ' Pjt \ a > 1 +  V jt)
There are two sources of persistent deviations from the traditional PPP 
relation in this expression. One is the existence of transaction costs, 
the other is the imperfect degree of substitutability between the goods. 
Denote the deviation of prices and the exchange rate i . j  from PPP bv
<I>ut
1 + y:,i tij 
1 +  vjt a,
This allows for a simplified version in natural logarithms of the previous 
relation:
In e f  =  In pit — In pjt 4- In A>',J (6)




























































































Hence the variability of the deviations from PPP can be attributed to 
the variability of transactions costs. In addition, consider the following 
definition of the volatility of the exchange rate between currency ? and 
currency j :
o \ e ' > )  =  E , (in e|J+1—.E dlne^j])2 (<)
Substituting equation (6) into this definition, it is possible to describe 
the volatility of the exchange rate in terms of the volatility of prices and 
transaction costs:
v 2(eij) =  Et {tS(Pit+1)- ts(pjt+i)+ (5($;j+1))2 (8)
where tS (x t+i) = (ln it+ i — lnEtflna^+i]), for any variable x.
Given that in this equilibrium all cash-in-advance constraints repre­
sented by equation (2) hold with equality and markets clear (i.c. cJt =  )],. 
Vj) it is possible to identify a quantity theory of money relation in this
economy, where, --------  =  Vjt is the velocity of money j :
1 _  V j t
Mjt = PjtCjt -  VjtPjtYjt =  (1 -  Vjt)PjtYjt (9)
For the equilibrium interest rates the expression becomes more com­
plicated as it will depend on the covariance between inflation and the 
inter-temporal rate of substitution in consumption:
i _  j3E  » '(o+ 1 ) Pn  
(1 +  b«) " ' [ E (ct) pjt+i
3 Exchange rate volatility  and productiv­
ity  trends
The first step will be to determine how shocks will affect this economy at 
time t+ 1 . Following Canzoneri and Dellas(1995), the stochastic behavior 




























































































4 j ( + l  I  j t z j t + l
1 J/ + 1 ~
( 10)
( 11)
where cjt+i-VJt+i are exogenous random shocks affecting output and ve­
locity respectively, uncorrelated over time and identically distributed, 
such that:
The relevance of these assumptions will be discussed in the empirical 
application. The next step will be to determine how policy choices will 
affect the behavior of prices. As a benchmark, it will be useful to assume 
first that the Central Banks in all countries target nominal income. Let 
k * be the nominal income target in country j .  such that:
Then, substituting the behavior of output given by equation (10) into 
the nominal income targeting rule yields the following relation between 
inflation and productivity shocks:
By writing this expression in logarithms it is possible to show that, under 
this policy regime, next period output shocks (and only these) translate 
into next period price ‘surprises’, defined as lnpJ(+] — E t [lnpJ(+i]:
E  [In £j(+i] =  E  [lnuj(+i] =  0
( 12)
Pjt+i (13)
P j t  £ j t + l
E t [ln/ty+i] =  In k* -  Inpjt




























































































This expression can now be used to express the variance of the exchange 
rate i j  in terms of the variances and covariances of the exogenous shocks 
hitting economies i and j .  Substituting this into equation (8) yields:
<j2(ei]) =  Vart+l [lneJt+i -  lnei(+1] +
+Vdr(+i [ln$;j] +  2Covt+i [(ln£J(+i -  In £„+i). In $ |J]
(15)
It might be reasonable to expect the covariance term to be positive, 
since there is empirical evidence of a negative relationship between trans­
actions costs and volume.6 Therefore, omitting deviations from PPP 
from the analysis may produce a downward bias in the estimates for 
volatility. Denote <r2(e'J) the ‘biased’ volatility estimate:
à 2{e'3) = Vart+i [ln£j(+i -  h i (16)
If the bias resulting from the omission of transactions costs is approxi­
mately the same for all European currencies, it should not significantly 
affect the ranking of those currencies in terms of volatility. In the fol­
lowing sections, this ‘biased’ volatility estimate will be used to assess the 
effects of EMU on exchange rate volatility, bearing in mind its possible 
limitations.
4 Effects o f EM U  on exchange rate volatil­
ity
In this section, it is assumed that, at the beginning of period t +  1, 
European countries form a Monetary Union. European output is given 































































































£ e ( + 1 — u ’g t £ g t + i  +  U’f t E f t + l
(18)
Omitting the effect of transactions costs, according to expression (16). 
the estimate for the euro-dollar exchange rate, under nominal income 
targeting, is given by:
where the superscripts and subscripts d and e denote dollar and euro 
respectively and where the European output shock is a function of the 
output shocks of each of the Eurozone economies, as defined by equation 
(18). Consequently, the bigger the euro area, the more composite the 
shock term will be. It is also easy to see that the dollar could be replaced 
by any other third currency, such as the yen. The estimate of the euro­
yen exchange rate volatility therefore can be written as:
To obtain some insight into whether the euro should be expected 
to be more or less volatile than the European currencies. Canzoneri and 
Dellas (1995). assuming that PPP holds, use such an estimate to analyze 
the volatility of the dollar-euro exchange rates for a Union comprising 
Germany, France, the UK and Italy. They estimate the output shocks for 
these countries and for the US using Solow residuals calculated by Glick 
and Rogoff (1993). In Canzoneri’s and Dcllas’s model goods are invoiced 
in the currency of the producer, which for the empirical estimates is the 





























































































invoice of trade.7 Their sample is 19G0-1990. animal observations and 
their results for the standard deviations of exchange rate predictioiperrors 
are summarized in the table below:8
Tabel 1: Model Estimates of Exchange Rate 
Volatility with Solow Residuals Data 
___________ d(rdi)  x 100 ____






Canzoneri and Dellas (1995)
These results suggest that the dollar-euro exchange rates should 
not be expected to be more volatile than the deutschemark, or any of the 
other currencies issued by the countries included in the analysis . These 
results do not have to correspond to real data, since, apart from the bias 
identified earlier, corresponding to the omission of transactions costs, 
these are the predictions of a model built under the assumption that 
all central banks target nominal income. It is interesting, nevertheless, 
to compare them with the standard deviations of log-changes of dollar 
exchange rates to see how they mimic, at least, the ranking of volatilities:9
1 The ECU Institute produces some statistics on the percentage of exports invoiced 
in the producers currency, but this type of data is not detailed enough to be used in 
this kind of exercise. The data, however corroborate the idea that the assumption 
that exports are invoiced in the producers currency is a second best assumption (ECU 
Institute, 1995).
“Estimated regressions and the covariance matrix are reported in Appendix 1.
9The volatility measure reported here is the standard deviation of the changes in 
the logarithm of annual dollar exchange rates measured as the average of the quaterly 




























































































Table 2: Standard Deviations of Log-Changes 
of Dollar Exchange Rates 
x 100
60 -  90 60 -  73 74 -  90
Germ any 9.80 5.40 12.40
France 10.60 4.95 13.57
U K 8.50 3.95 11.12
Ita ly 10.50 1.67 13.66
Europe - - -
O ECD  data fo r  nom inal exchange rates
We can verify that the ranking of the volatilities for the period 1960- 
1990 is similar, except for Italy. However, one of the assumptions of the 
model is a floating exchange rate regime. In fact, for the post-Bretton 
Woods period the ranking of the model becomes compatible with the 
true ranking. Nevertheless, it may be preferable to estimate productiv­
ity trends with data only referring to this period. Unfortunately, with 
the same data-set. estimations are limited to 17 observations. A sec­
ond drawback of the data-set used by Canzoneri and Dellas (1995) for 
this analysis is the fact that it can only allow for a test on the effects 
of adding the L1K and Italy as extra EMU members, while it should be 
interesting to analyze the effects of adding also the remaining EU coun­
tries, in particular those countries in the ‘periphery’. However, Solow 
Residuals databases are only available for a very restricted sample of 
countries, because reliable data to construct them is difficult to obtain. 
Going back to the theoretical model, it seems plausible to extract the 
innovations from output data directly.10 GDP data, being available in 
quarterly observations also allows us to extend the length of the time 
series.
10If shocks to output are mainly driven by productivity shocks (Solow residual 




























































































In order to analyze how GDP data compares with the data used in 
Canzoneri et al (1995) the same exercise was undertaken using the new 
data set for the same countries.11 The results obtained are summarized 
in Table 3:* 12
Table 3: Model Estimates of Exchange Rate 
Volatility with GDP Data
à ( e f )  x 100
1960 -  1990





E stim a tions based on the O ECD  data fo r  G D P
Although the absolute values differ, the new ranking based on GDP 
data is similar to that reported in Table 1. For this reason we will accept 
the GDP data to be compatible with their data. The advantage of using 
GDP is that it is available for all EU countries, for the US and for Japan, 
for a relatively long period.
Using this GDP data will allow us to test the effects of the mem­
bership of particular countries or groups of countries on the instability 
of the euro-dollar exchange rate. To address the problems stated before, 
the analysis will be undertaken using quarterly data from 1974 to 1995, 
for the US. and most EU members. The inclusion of Japanese data in the 
data-set will also allow us to make predictions for the euro-yen exchange 
rate.
' “Appendix 2 contains a description of the series.




























































































All estimates presented above omit the presence of transactions 
costs and incur the bias referred in the end of the last section. This omis­
sion. however, will still be necessary because the data needed to proxy 
these costs is not available.13 Data on bid-ask spreads, could provide 
a proxy for transactions costs in the foreign exchange market, although 
there is no consensus on whether this is an appropriate proxy, but there 
are problems with the datasets available. Datastream and other com­
mercial databases take just one particular quote of a single bank per day 
or the average of three or four banks at close of business. By comparing 
this number with the number of Reuters’ quotes during April that is re­
ported by Hartman(1997) one can have an idea of how imprecise these 
data are.14 The latter uses more reliable data adding information from 
various sources, but this data set is a short panel with only two years. 
The longest accurate time series data appears in Hartman(1996). but 
is just available for bid-ask spreads in dollar-ven transactions (between 
1986 and 1995).15
' ’Another way to overcome the problem could be to model deviations from PPP 
directly. However they may include other phenomena apart from transactions costs, 
such as measurement errors. Mic hael. Xobav and Peel(1990) show that the behaviour 
of deviations from PPP can be well described bv an exponential smooth transition 
autoregressive (ESTAR) model. Fitting this process it is possible to extract the i.i.d. 
innovations in the deviations from PPP.
14Table 1, page 34.
loPortes and Rev (1998) estimate the volumes of trade in each currency and use 
Hartmann (1997)\s estimates for the elasticity of transactions costs with respect to 
forex volumes (-0.003). in order to obtain the ‘expected’ levels of euro transactions 
costs under different scenarios. This indirect approach may be appropriate to estimate 




























































































5 Euro Exchange R ate V olatility  and EM Ù  
com position
In order to test how euro exchange rate volatility depends on the compo­
sition of EMU, several ‘monetary unions' were constructed: the ‘Core’, 
formed by Germany, France, Austria and the Netherlands (Belgium and 
Luxembourg excluded); the ‘Core&ita’, where Italy was added to the 
previous list of countries: the ‘Eurozone’, which includes the countries 
that have joined the single currency in the first stage, except for Bel­
gium, Luxembourg and Spain: the ‘Euro&uk’, which results from adding 
the UK to the ‘Eurozone’: and, finally, the ‘Euro&outs’, formed by all 
the countries included in the ‘Eurozone’ group plus the UK. Denmark 
and Sweeden (Greece excluded). As far as Belgium, Luxembourg. Greece 
and Spain are concerned, the data for these countries do not seem com­
parable with the data for the other countries, in terms of “frequency”. In 
some of these cases the data may have been interpolated from annual ob­
servations and do not seem appropriate for extracting quarterly shocks. 
For these reasons, those countries were excluded from the analysis.
European shocks for these different ‘monetary unions', were con­
structed. on the basis of historical GDP trends, following equation (18). 
which gives the aggregate shock as a weighted combination of the indi­
vidual member countries’ shocks. The latter were estimated by fitting 
independent AR processes to the GDP series of each participating coun­
try, according to the assumptions of equation (10).
Allowing for the fact that German data after unification incorpo­
rates the data from East Germany, the statistical model assumed for 
output in section 4 seems to mimic the behavior of the data fairly well, 
except for the periods following both oil shocks in a number of countries 
and for the period corresponding to the steep 1978 recession in Austria 
and for the ‘Irish boom’ after 1994.16 Estimations are reported in Ap­
pendix 4. The variances and covariances of the error terms obtained




























































































imply the following results for the euro-dollar/ euro-yen exchange rate 
volatilities:
Table 4 •' Model Estimates of the volatility of dollar and yen 
exchange rates against the German currency 
and hypothetical ‘EMU' currencies








E stim a tions  based on O ECD  data fo r  G D P (1974-1995)
The results suggest that the euro exchange rates against the two 
other major international currencies should be expected to be less volatile 
compared with the earlier deutschemark exchange rate. The deutschemark 
here is used as a benchmark because it is the European currency with a 
most prominent role in International Finance. The EMU that delivers 
the highest stability against the dollar is a monetary union formed by all 
the countries in the sample. In particular, the UK’s opt-out clause seems 
to have an opportunity cost in terms of euro exchange rate stability. The 
decrease of volatility in the case of the UK can be easily explained by 
a high covariance with the US, associated with its high GDP weight.17 
In fact, adding the UK reduces the variance of European-wide distur­
bances and enhances their covariance with US shocks. In what concerns 
the volatility of the euro-yen exchange rate, the membership of Sweden




























































































and Denmark shows a positive impact on volatility, mainly due to the 
negative covariance of these countries’ GDP with that of Japan.18
To verify whether the numbers reported above are statistically dif­
ferent from each other, a statistical test was carried out. This was con­
structed on the basis of the tests proposed by Diebold and Mariano(1995) 
for comparing forecast errors. For a loss function such as the square of 
the forecast errors, the difference between two loss series (ef,— s2,) has an 
asymptotically normal distribution. Therefore, the large sample A’(0 .1) 
statistic for testing the null hypothesis that the error series arc different is 
S  = Y,{Eit~s2jt) l(T o ). where a  is the standard deviation of the difference 
of the losses. To test whether the disturbances found for the different 
‘EMUs’ are statistically different, the series (ef(— £2Jt) were regressed on 
a constant. Notice that the t — test for the hypothesis that the constant 
is equal to zero corresponds to S. The tests undertaken are reported in 
Appendix 5 and imply that most of the values in the previous table are 
considered satistically different from each other.19
Overall, most results seem to corroborate Martin(1997)’s conclusion 
that the larger the monetary union, the more stable it must be. However, 
in this case, it is the particular characteristics of productivity trends 
that account for this finding, and not the size in itself. In fact, adding 
Denmark and Sweden to the group of ‘Euro&uk’. enhances the volatility 
of the euro-yen exchange rate due to the negative covariance between 
the output shocks of these countries with the Japanese output shocks. 
EMU does not simply enlarge any existing economy, it instead applies a 
common monetary policy to different economies with their own specific 
features.
18These negative covariances appear even if no dummies are included in the 
regressions.
19According to this test, however, the membership of the uk is not statistically sig­
nificant. It should be noted though that this test must be considered with reservation 




























































































6 Changes in V elocity
The ranking reported above may be subject to endogeneity problems. 
Although productivity trends should not be expected to change signif­
icantly with the monetary Union, velocity trends may change dramati­
cally. This is an important issue, specially if the ECB does not target 
nominal income, but instead targets money growth:
(20)
Substituting the monetary policy rule (20) into the velocity of money 
relation yields the following behavior for inflation:
Pt+1 _  . % i  
Pi 3 £f+i
(21)
In this case velocity shocks are important for the analysis. In particular, 
substituting the logarithm of this policy function into equation (8) and 
ignoring again the effect of transactions costs20, the expression for the 
estimated volatility of the exchange rate will now take the following form, 
for all i . j :
<72(fi!i i)  =  Vart+i In ( 5" +1/ t>,+ |N) ( 22)
In order to find out how the inclusion of velocity shocks in the anal­
ysis may affect the results, it is important to define European velocity, 
in terms of the data from the individual countries. European velocity 
could be defined as a weighted average of the velocities observed in each 
member country and it seems reasonable to assume that the weights will
20The bias from ignoring transactions costs in this section will be essenciallv the 
same as the one described before, provided that shocks in transaction costs are not 




























































































correspond to the relative size of each member state.21 Taking ir,i, and 
Wft defined in equation (18) it will be assumed that:22 -*■
where
Vt i+1 =  H’rffl d t + l  +  U' f l  V /(  + l — T / U l + l
w l < v f tU'dt 1 dt
t ’rt+1 — ------P ---- ;---------7 ^ ~ v dt + 1 +
« ’</(> dt  ■+- U ' d A d l  +  « ' /  A f t
(23)
( 21 )
By allowing for velocity shocks and repeating the exercise' of the pre­
vious section, it is possible to verify that conclusions remain unchanged 
even when velocity trends are taken into consideration.23 European 
velocity shocks for these different 'monetary unions', were constructed 
following equation (24). which gives the aggregate velocity shock as a 
weighted combination of member countries' velocity disturbances. The 
later were estimated by fitting independent AR processes to the veloc­
ity series of each participating country, according to the assumptions of 
equation (11).
The simple AR1 processes assumed seem to describe the data rea­
sonably well except in the case of the US. Finland and the UK. In the 
case of both Finland and the UK this can be attributed to redefinitions 
of the Money aggregate that caused structural breaks in the Ml veloc­
ity series in 1980:1 and 1987:1 respectively. As for the US. a simple AR1 
process cannot explain the periods of 'loose' monetary policy: 1985.1986.
■'This assumption is different from what is assumed in Canzonet! and Dellas( 1995), 
where the velocities in Europe are assumed to be the sum of the velocities in each 
member state. We consider that it is nessessary to weight velocities by size to make 
the new aggregate consistent with a velocity of money equation for Europe.
22Alternatively, European velocity could l>e constructed directly from the country's 
cash-in-advance constraints. This would imply that, the weights should be the amount 
of cash balances in each economy, which could be proxied bv today’s cash balances 
converted into euros with the euro convertion rates.





























































































1990. 1991. 1992 (OECD Economic Surveys. US. 1987/1988. 1993). Tak­
ing into account these observations, three different dummies were used 
to correct for the breaks in these series. Estimation results are reported 
in Appendix 7. while the data is described in Appendix 6. The impact 
of velocity shocks on the estimated euro exchange rate volatility of the 
several ‘EMUs' was calculated by substituting the estimated errors in 
equation (22). The results are summarized in the next table.
Table 5: Model Estimates for the volatility of the dollar and yen 
exchange rates against the German currency and hypothetical 









E stim ations bast'd on OECIJ data fo r  (ID E  and M l (1974-1995)
The ranking of the volatilities of dcutschcmark and the different 
euro-dollar exchange rates remains the same, except for the group named 
‘EuroiCouts' ( the membership of Denmark shows a positive impact on 
the euro dollar volatility under Money target). Monetary union and. in 
particular, a large monetary union between European countries seems 
to increase stability relatively to the deutscheinark. These results may 
be related to the findings that a European-wide money demand function 
appears to be more stable than national demand functions. The reason 
for these empirical findings has been attributed to the internalization 
of currency substitution effects between European currencies, through 




























































































correlated due to their origin in currency substitution, whilst aggregation 
to a higher level internalizes such shocks. *"
A survey of the literature on area-wide money demand estimation 
can be found in Artis (1996). It describes the main contributions in this 
area and shows how the several estimated coefficients presented are rea­
sonably stable between studies and time periods, with correct signs' and 
plausible values and how stable cointegrating equations of a relatively 
simple kind were found.24 It is important to remark though that, its no­
ticed by the author, virtually every specification described in this survey 
incorporates what has been labelled a ‘currency substitution term’ to ac­
count for substitution between European currencies and the dollar, which 
has proved to be very important for the good diagnostic performance of 
the equations. Disregarding the issue of whether the proxies chosen are 
actually good proxies for the phenomena that they aim to characterize, 
the hypothesis that currency substitution between the dollar and the euro 
may increase dramatically with the monetary union, makes it difficult to 
draw conclusions about the stability of the single money aggregate, which 
is likely to be as vulnerable to transatlantic currency substitution shocks 
as the European national currencies were among themselves.
Therefore, velocity trends may change dramatically after a mone­
tary union is formed and the debate on whether the future European-wide 
money demand function maybe more or less stable than the former na­
tional money demands is still unresolved. However, this paper suggests 
that, ultimately, the importance of velocity shocks for the stability of 
the euro will depend on the policy options of the ECB and on its ability 
to insulate the economy from them. Additionally, the bias related to 
deviations from PPP may suffer from a structural break: however, it is 
plausible to expect that monetary unification will reduce its importance, 
not only because the basket of goods produced in Europe overall can be 
expected to become a close substitute for the basket produced in the US.
24The contributions surveyed are: Bekx and Tulio (1990), Kramers and Lane (1990), 
Artis et al.(1993), Monticelli and Strauss-Kahn (1993), Cassard et al. (1990), Tullio 




























































































but also because, in terms of transactions costs, it has been anticipated 
that euro assets should become as liquid as dollar or yen denominated 
assets, though this hypothesis needs further investigation.
7 C oncluding Rem arks
Previous studies that tried to argue about the outcome of monetary union 
in terms of exchange rate stability have paid very little attention to the 
behavior of the relevant disturbances at an aggregate level. This paper 
tries to argue that aggregation, in the case of Europe, acts like portfo­
lio diversification. Due to the presence of asymmetric shocks between 
European economies, aggregation may yield an overall more stable econ­
omy. In addition, the membership of countries that have a high positive 
(negative) business cycle correlation with the US and Japan would also 
contribute to decrease (increase) the variability of the exchange rate, be­
cause they make movements in the overall European output more (less) 
correlated with those in the US and Japan. Since productivity trends are 
not likely to change significantly in any foreseeable future, if the future 
ECB is able to insulate the European Economy from velocity shocks, then 
this result is likely to hold after the formation of EMU. Velocity trends, 
however, should be expected to change dramatically with the introduc­
tion of the euro, specially if the latter is to become a major international 
currency.
Although it is likely that European velocity may be more unstable 
in the event of internationalization, velocity shocks in Europe may start 
to become more correlated with those in the US. In fact, once countries 
start to hold as much reserves in dollars as in euros, Balance of Payments 
crises in third countries will start to affect the euro as much as the dollar, 
leaving the euro-dollar exchange rate unaffected by the turmoil. Whether 




























































































of empirical investigation to be carried out ex-post. Ex-ante one thing 
can be stated: if the ECB does not want at all to take the risk that 
the new common currency introduces long-run instability in the system, 
it should aim. with its policy choices and expertise, at insulating the 





























































































[1] Aizenman. J. (1984) “Modeling Deviations from Purchasing Power 
Parity", International Economic Review, 25, 175-191.
[2] Artis. M. (1996) “Currency Substitution in European Financial Mar­
kets” . in Mizen, Paul (1996) The Macroeconomics of International 
Currencies: Theory, Policy and Evidence, p.139-154.
[3] Benassy-Quere. A., Mojon, B. and Pisani-Ferry, ,1.(1997). "The Euro 
and Exchage Rate Stability”, CEPII. Document de Travail 97-12.
[4] Benassy-Quere. A.. Mojon. B.( 1998). “EMU and Transatlantic Ex­
change Rate Stability”. CEPII. Document de Travail 98-02.
[5] Canzoneri, M. and Dellas. H. (1995),“Monetary Integration in Eu­
rope: Implications for Real Interest Rates. National Stock Markets 
and the Volatilities of Prices and Exchange Rates”, Catholic Uni­
versity of Leuven, International Economics Reseach Paper 116.
[6] Cohen. D. (1997). “How will The Euro Behave?”, CEPR 1673.
[7] ECU Institute (1995). International Currency Competition and the 
Future Role of the Single European Currency. Kluwer Law Interna­
tional.
[8] Davutyan. N. and Pippenger. .1. (1990) “Testing Purchasing Power 
Parity: Some Evidence of the Effects of Transaction Costs”. Econo­
metric Reviews. 9(2), 211-240.
[9] Diebold. F. and Mariano. R. (1995). “Comparing Predictive Accu­
racy”, Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, Vol. 13, No3, p. 
253-263.
[10] Dixit. A. (1989). “Entry and Exit Decisions Under Uncertainty”, J. 
P. E. 97. 1




























































































[12] Krugman. P. (1989b), “The Case for Stabilising Exchange Hates".
Oxford Review of Economic Policy 5. ^
[13] Hartmann, P. (1996). “Trading Volumes and Transactions Costs 
in the Foreign Exchange Market/ Evidence from Dollar-Yen Spot 
Data”, LSE Finacial Markets Group. Discussion Paper Series 232.
[14] Hartmann. P. (1997). “Do Reuters Spreads Reflect Currencies' Dif­
ferences in Global Trading Activity?”. LSE Finacial Markets Group. 
Discussion Paper Series 265.
[15] Isard, P. and Ricci. L. (1998), “EMU, Adjustment, and Exchange 
Rate Variability”, IMF. W P/98/50.
[16] Martin(1997), “The Exchange Rate Policy of the Euro: a Matter of 
Size?”, CEPR. discussion paper 1646.
[17] Masson, P. and Turtelboom. B. (1997) “The Characteristics of the 
Euro, the Demand for Reserves, and Policy Coordination Linder 
EMU”, in Krueger. T.. Masson. P. and Turtelboom. B. (1997). EMU 
and the International Monetary System, p. 194-224. IMF.
[18] McKinnon. R. (1996). The Rules of the Game, MIT Press.
[19] OECD Economic Surveys.
[20] Panos. M.. Nobay. A. and Peel D. (1997), “Transactions Costs and 
Nonlinear Adjustments in the Real Exchange Rates”, Journal of 
Political Economy. 1997. vol 105, n.4.
[21] Portes. R. and Rey. H. (1998), “The Emergence of the Euro as an 
International Currency”, Economic Policy, No 26, 307-343, April 
1998.
[22] Rey, H. (1997), “International Trade and Currency Exchange”, Cen­




























































































Appendix 1 : Canzoneri and Dellas Estimates25
Table A 1.1: Stochastic Processes for Productivity
Dependent variable : In A',




(002) 2.9% 99% 1.50
Germany 0.23
(0.06)















Based on data  for Solow Residuals, 1960-1990 (Glick and Rogoff 1993)
Table A l.2: Variance-Covariance Matrix of Productivity Shocks 
_____________ Cov(£jt+i,Eu+i) X 100______________
US Ger Fra UK Ita Eur
US 0.080 0.026 0.011 0.051 0.023 -
Ger 0.051 0.022 0.026 0.030 0.034
Fra 0.030 0.023 0.018 0.023
UK 0.071 0.019 0.033
Ita 0.113 0.041
Eur 0.015




























































































Appendix 2 : Output and Exchange Rates Data De­
scription
The first differences of the data constructed for the US. Japan and 
the eleven EU countries included in the model is shown in Figure 1. while 
the data for the EU countries excluded from the model (Luxembourg. 
Belgium, Spain and Greece) is shown in Figure 2.
Figure 1: First Differences in Real GDP Scries for the US, Japan and 11 
EU countries - Constructed from OECD Series.
• 06p
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Figure 2: First Differences in Real GDP Series for Belgium, Luxembourg. 
Spain and Greece - Constructed from OECD Series.
» 1 n B« 1 =___  (InUix:___
The GDP data was constructed on the basis of quarterly seasonally 
adjusted observations of GDP nominal data denominated in the home 
currency. The GDP deflator with base in 1990 was used to obtain GDP 
at constant prices of 1990. The data was converted into dollars at the 
1990 PPP conversion rates. Annual data refers to the sum of quar­
terly data. All data was obtained from the OECD National Accounts 
statistics. Data on dollar nominal exchange rates consists on dollars per 




























































































Appendix 3 : GDP Estimates for Canzoneri et al.(1995)
Sub-set of Countries and Sample Period.
Table A3.1: Stochastic Processes for Output
Dependent variable : In A',
c In A ,-! S E E R2 D \V
US 0.27
(0.14)
0.98(001) 1.4% 99% 1.67
Germanj' 0.28
(0.12)







0.99(0.02) 0.9% 99% 1.51
Italy 0.35
(0.08)
0.96(001) 1.0% 99% 1.90
Based on the OECD data  for Real GDP, 1960-1990, described in Appendix 2
Table A3.2: Variance-Covariance Matrix of Productivity Shocks 
______________Cm'(ejt+i.e,(+i) x 100_____________
US Ger Fra UK Ita Eur
US 0.048 0.021 0.007 0.026 0.008 0.016
Ger 0.040 0.017 0.018 0.015 -
Fra 0.016 0.011 0.013 -






























































































Table A4.1: Stochastic Processes for Output -Specification 1
Appendix 4 : GDP Estimates for US, Japan and 11
EU Countries (1974-95 Quarterly).
Dependent variable : In A'( Ft2 =  99%



































































1.1% 2.56 1.72 5.49
Based on the OECD data for Real GDP, 1974-1995, described in Appendix 2;
“‘ Rejection at 109c significance: “Rejection at 59c.
The results of ‘Specification 1’ (Table A4.1) show that some equa­




























































































autocorrelation and some show non-normality. These problems are cor­
rected in the final specification reported in Table A4.2. with the intro­
duction several dummy variables to account for disturbances that the 
model cannot explain. The first are those caused by the deep recessions 
in Germany. France. Italy and Portugal after the first oil shock (D IO S). 
The 1974-1975 recession was sharper in these countries than generally 
elsewhere.. In Germany the fact was due to the sharp fall in the export 
volume linked with the fact that the German economy was heavily de­
pendent on export demand, while in France it was the marked fall in 
private investment, in the fourth quarter of 1974. that determined the 
poor performance of GDP in that quarter and the next. In Italy the 
delayed but hash recession was caused by the combination of a slowdown 
in demand with tight economic policies introduced in the end of 74, in­
cluding substantial tax increases and higher interest rates, introduced to 
refrain the expansionary trend that the economy was experiencing when 
the first oil shock broke. Only when the deepest recession experienced 
by the country since the early 1950’s was already being felt did the Ital­
ian authorities shift the economic policy. As for Portugal, the post first 
oil shock recession was deepened by the transformation of the country's 
political institutions in the aftermath of the April 74 revolution, when 
the economy had to contend with nationalizations, collectivizations and 
strikes, with the loss of the colonies as a source of cheep raw material and 
with the return flow of Portuguese nationals from Angola and Mozam­
bique.
Also the effects of the second oil shock in the US, Germany, France, 
the Netherlands. Italy and the UK cannot be explained by the sim­
ple AR1 process and had to be accounted for with a dummy variable 
(D IIO S ). Additionally, another dummy variable was introduced to ex­
plain the behavior of the Austrian GDP growth in the beginning of 1978 
(Dans). In this economy, the prior announcement of VAT increases and 
modifications in depreciation rules in mid 1977 to be applied in 1978, 
led to considerable advance purchases in the last quarters of that year. 
This was combined with postponement of investment spending caused 




























































































of the same year and resulted in a very depressed GDP growth for the 
beginning of 1978. The shift in the trend caused by the Irish boom also 
had to be accounted for with dummy variables ( D ire).26
Table A4.2: Stochastic Processes for Output - Final Specification
Dependent variable : In X t R 2 =  99%
c 111 A ',_ J D gcm u
aus
ire
D ,o s D /IO S S E E D \V




- - -0 .016
(0.004)
0 .6 % 1.45




— — — 0.4% 1.88















































— — — 1.9% 1.81




0 .0 2 1  
(0 005)
- - 1 .0 % 1.57




— -0.026  
(0 009)
— 1.1% 1.75




- - -0 .017
(0007)
0.7% 1.80











































































































In this final specification all equations pass the 'portmanteau' au­
tocorrelation test with 8 lags and the \ 2 normality text at the 10 percent 
significance level except for the German equation which satisfies the nor­
mality test at the 10 percent significance level but the autocorrelation 
test only at the 5 percent significance level. A dummy for the second 
oil shock was not significant for Japan. Austria. Finland. Ireland and 
Portugal.
Table A4.3: Variance-Covariance Matrix of
Productivity Shocks





Ger 0.045 - 0.009 0.006
Aus 0.071 0.025 0.004 0.005
Fra 0.033 0.019 0.005 0.007
Net 0.083 0.020 0.010 0.012
Ita 0.03G 0.013 0.005 0.008
Fin 0.224 0.003 0.004 0.001
Ire 0.101 0.009 0.004 0.008
Por 0.14G 0.01G 0.009 0.017
Uk 0.088 0.003 0.014 0.005
Den 0.132 0.01G 0.030 -0.008
Swc 0.137 0.009 0.010 -0.005




























































































Significance Tests for the ranking of volatilities were constructed on 
the basis of the tests for ranking forecasting errors developed by Diebold 
and Mariano (1995). Any two volatility values were considered to be sta­
tistically different whenever the two series of European’ output shocks 
that generated each of them were found to be statistically different. ‘Eu­
ropean’ output shocks’ series were estimated according to equation (18). 
using the results of the final specification reported in Appendix 4. Here 
mostly the significance of any two consecutive volatility values was tested 
for, but a test on the significance of the ranking between the volatility of 
the euro exchange rates of the ‘Eurozone’ and the ‘Euro&outs’ was also 
included. The results are reported in Table A5.1. These tests, though 
must be looked at with some reservation since they were found to have a 
higher peak around their mean of zero than a normal distribution would 
have.
Appendix 5 : Ranking Significance Tests for Estimates
under Nominal Income Targeting
Table A5.1: Ranking Tests (Nominal Income Targeting) 
- Final Specification -
Tests costant t-value D\V
Germany vs Core 1.70E — 05 3.63 1.66
Core vs Core&ita 4.26E -  06 2.66 1.89
Core&ita vs Eurozone 8.COE -  07 2.00 1.97
Eurozone vs Euro&uk 1 .7 7 E -0 6 1.08 1.59
Euro&uk vs Euro&outs 1.03E — 06 2.00 2.22
Eurozone vs Euro&outs 2.80E -  06 1.62 1.66
Results suggest that the estimates for the euro volatilities of the 
Core can be considered significantly different than those estimated for the 
deutschemark. since the t-value for the constant term is high. Similarly, 
adding Italy to the Core to form ‘Core&ita’ or adding Finland, Ireland 
and Portugal to the ‘Core&ita’ to form the ‘Eurozone’ seems to have a 




























































































Sweden and Denmark to the group of ‘Euro&uk’. Adding the UK does 
not seem to have a significant impact, although, due to the non-normality 
of the test, rejecting any significance requires the investigation of the 
appropriate critical values which are likely to he lower than 2.
Appendix 6: Velocity Data Description.
Figure 3: First Differences in Ml Velocity Series for the US. Japan and 
Europe - Constructed from OECD Series.
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The velocity data was constructed on the basis of quarterly season­
ally adjusted observations for M l, obtained from the OECD database. 




























































































money series was adjusted for seasonality with the method of average 
deviations from the trend, taking into account the break in 1987. The 
first differences of the series constructed are shown in Figure 3.
Appendix 7 : Velocity Estimates for US, Japan and 
11 EU countries - 1974-1995 Quarterly Data
Table A7.1: Stochastic Processes for Velocity
Dependent variable : In Vt






















































— — — 9.8% 98% 1.83











— — — 5.5% 98% 1.65




























































































Appendix 8 : Ranking Significance Tests for Estimates
under Money Targeting -y
Table A8.1: Ranking Tests (Money Targeting) 
- Final Specification -
Tests costant t-value D\Y
Germany vs Core 2.06E -  04 3.11 1.93
Core vs Coreidta 3.06E -  05 2.82 1.97
Core&ita vs Eurozone 7.94E -  0G 2.55 1.84
Eurozone vs Eurofcuk —6.02.E -  0G -0 .28 2.18
Euro&uk vs Euro&outs 2.59E -  0G 2.80 1.92
Eurozone vs Eurofeouts 2.80E -  0G 1.62 l.GG
Appendix 9: The Budget Constraint
In order to solve for first order conditions, it is easier to rewrite the 
budget constraint:
[■‘t / j r — 1 ~k Hi t — i P i T  — 11 i t — 1 “  P i T — I ^ i t — 1 ] (1 “k t ’irid"
+  ftT- l  i  ̂fJ T -  1 "k HjT~ i P j T — 1 1 J T - 1  P j T —l ^ j r — 1 ] (1 “k tj r )" k
+ A -1  +  H kr — lP k r —1 t  irr— 1 ~  M-t-IO h—l] (1 +  ti’Ar) +
+  [(1 + hr-d-B ir-l +  (1 — t/ir— l Tr —1 + T,t ] (1 + f ir )
+ ftr [(1 +  bT -l)# ji—1 +  (1 _ 1]jT-l)PjT- 11jr - 1 +  Tjr] (1 +  ij’jr)
+ e'f  [(1 +  +  (1 — 1 l k r - l ) P k T - l Y k T - l  +  T k r ] (1 +  l l 'k r )
— [A/|T +  B ,T] (1 +  — Ct [A/jt +  B j t ] (1 +  —
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